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ABSTRACT 
It is well known that there is no consensus with respect to the relationship between 
unemployment and crime.  As well, there is very little research on the linkages between 
crime and the educational experiences of young people. In this paper we show a very 
strong positive relationship between criminal activity and the extent of youth male long-
term unemployment. We also show that criminal activity is negatively associated high 
school completions, and positively associated with high school non-completion rates.  
 
The analysis suggests that labour market and education policies have the potential to 
significantly reduce property crime. However, increased high school participation of the 
targeted group only decreases crime if it results in graduation. This suggests that the 
effectiveness of education policy is a critical influence on crime activity, a unique finding 
for the literature. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Research into the relationship between unemployment and crime has a long history 
but has not produced a consensus. It is almost trite to observe that aggregate-level 
studies generally yield inconsistent results.  As Chamlin and Cochran (2000) so 
eloquently point out: 
 
‘It has become almost obligatory to begin any macro-level discussion of 
the unemployment-crime relationship with the observation that extant 
research findings are varied, complex, and/or equivocal.  Typically, this 
lament serves as a segue into a recapitulation of the numerous, and often 
countervailing, theoretical processes that are thought to mediate the effects 
of unemployment and crime, sophisticated methodological critiques of 
recent efforts to estimate the unemployment-crime association, and 
ultimately, the development of alternative statistical techniques and 
modelling strategies better to take into account the intricacies of the causal 
linkages between unemployment and crime’ (Chamlin and Cochran, 2000: 
443). 
 
Chamlin and Cochran contend that mismeasurement of unemployment is the principal 
reason for the failure to observe a consistent association between unemployment and 
crime.  This article provides support to their conclusion.  We argue, however, that the 
measurement problems they identify are symptomatic of more general theoretical 
weaknesses in the literature on unemployment and crime.  In particular, too little 
attention has been paid to the inter-relationships between property crime, 
unemployment duration and high school completion. 
  
Just as the term ‘crime’ denotes a wide variety of types of criminal activities which 
can respond differently to changes in unemployment, so unemployment is a 
heterogenous construct, varying in terms of age, gender, period of unemployment and 
the educational qualifications of those who find themselves unemployed. Given that 
engagement in criminal activity is a choice made by individuals in the context of the 
relative attraction of legitimate activities (employment) and illegitimate activities 
these are very important distinctions. Each is highly pertinent to an individual’s future 
expectations of legitimate employment and earnings prospects. Yet, the fact remains 
that unemployment is mostly treated as an homogenous entity with direct and 
uncomplicated linkages to crime.  
 
This study, therefore, aims to investigate the impact of unemployment duration and 
school participation on aggregate rates of property crime.  In particular, we analyse 
data on one type of crime only (household break, enter and steal) and from one State 
of Australia (New South Wales (NSW)) over the period January 1989 to December 
1999.  We focus on two aspects of unemployment composition generally overlooked 
in time series analysis of links between unemployment and crime: the duration of 
unemployment and the age composition of the unemployment stock.  In addition, we 
explore the links between high school completion and the level of criminal activity. 
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The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
on the link between unemployment and crime, on the one hand, and participation in 
post-compulsory education and crime, on the other hand.  Section 3 proposes a 
theoretical structure, and this is utilised to promote understanding of the link between 
unemployment duration and crime.  Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 
presents empirical tests of the model. Section 6 illustrates the meaning of the results 
through consideration of the effectiveness of a number of hypothetical policy 
scenarios concerning targeted labour market programs and educational participation 
with respect to their impact on property crime levels.   
 
2 The  Literature 
 
Aggregate-level studies on unemployment and crime  
 
As Chiricos (1987) pointed out in his seminal review of the literature more than a 
decade ago, most of the inconsistency among aggregate-level studies of 
unemployment and crime stems from time series rather than cross-sectional studies.  
Nothing much has changed since his review.  Land, Cantor and Russell (1995) found 
a positive relationship between unemployment and crime in post-War United States.  
Kapuscinski, Braithwaite and Chapman (1998) found a strong positive relationship 
between unemployment and trends in homicide in Australia between 1917 and 1987.  
Weatherburn, Lind and Ku (2001), however, found no evidence of any relationship 
between unemployment and crime in a study of the effect of the last Australian 
recession on break, enter and steal, and motor vehicle theft.  Field (1990, 1999) found 
no effect of unemployment on post-War British crime trends.  
 
From time to time, the inconsistent results obtained in aggregate-level time series 
studies of unemployment and crime have prompted researchers to question whether 
there is any causal relationship between them.  Freeman (1983:89) contended that the 
empirical evidence showed at best only ‘a moderate link between unemployment and 
crime’.  Chiricos (1987:188) has spoken of the ‘consensus of doubt’ surrounding the 
relationship between unemployment and crime.  Field (1990:40) expressed serious 
doubts about the relevance of unemployment to an understanding of British crime 
trends.  Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:164) have argued that the relationship between 
unemployment and crime is ‘too small to be of theoretical import’ and ‘tends to be in 
the wrong direction’.  Pyle and Deadman (1994) have suggested that unemployment 
may be less important to crime than other indicators of economic activity. 
 
A close reading of the relevant literature, however, suggests that the inconsistent 
results obtained in time series studies of the relationship between unemployment and 
crime may stem from lack of theoretical subtlety in the way unemployment has been 
seen to influence crime.  
 
Conceptualising the unemployment effect 
 
Most aggregate-level studies ignore what might be called unemployment composition 
effects.  The unemployed (or young unemployed males) are implicitly treated as a 
homogenous stock of individuals, all equally disposed to respond to unemployment by 
becoming involved in crime.  Yet, as we noted earlier, the pool of unemployed at any  
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given time consists of individuals who vary markedly in terms of factors (e.g. age, 
gender, education and period of unemployment) which affect their future 
employability.  One would expect an individual’s future employment prospects to 
exert a significant effect on the way they respond to unemployment, regardless of 
whether the unemployed turn to crime in response to frustration, social alienation or 
for reasons of material gain.  
 
The longer the period of joblessness, for example, the greater the atrophy in human 
capital (Rummery, 1989).  As a consequence, the longer the period of unemployment, 
the lower is the probability of acquiring a job.  Even if the expected returns from 
illegitimate income earning activity do not increase with the period of unemployment, 
over time the overall balance of effort and reward must begin to tip away from 
(legitimate) job search behaviour toward illegitimate income earning activity.  Similar 
effects can be expected in relation to those whose job prospects are compromised by 
criminal conviction or lack of education.  Their commitment to socially approved 
behaviour or ways of earning income is likely to be more severely challenged by the 
experience of being unemployed than those who see unemployment as a transient 
phase between school and work. 
 
If the characteristics of the unemployed play a role in shaping their reaction to 
unemployment we should expect characteristics of the labour market to exert the same 
effect.  Individuals becoming unemployed during a period of high demand for labour 
can be expected to form different views about the expected costs and benefits of 
involvement in crime to those entering unemployment at a time of high demand for 
labour.  In the latter case there is less reason to expect the period of unemployment to 
be long or the financial returns to employment to be small.   
 
Longitudinal research on unemployment and crime 
 
Longitudinal studies bear out some of these expectations.  Thornberry and Christensen 
(1984) found that the relationship between unemployment and arrests was much 
stronger for those who had a prior history of delinquency and those who worked in 
‘blue collar’ occupations.  Farrington et al.(1986) found that the tendency to offend 
more frequently during periods of unemployment was more pronounced among 
individuals whose family or social background pre-disposed them to involvement in 
crime and among those whose employment since leaving school was in low status 
occupations.  Fagan and Freeman (1999) cite several European studies indicating that 
human capital variables mediate the effect of unemployment; those having a high 
school degree or coming from a higher SES background being far less likely to 
respond to unemployment by becoming involved in crime. 
 
Thornberry and Christenson (1984) found that a strong concurrent relationship 
between the proportion of time spent unemployed in a particular year and the number 
of arrests in that year.  Good, Pirog-Good and Sickles (1986) obtained similar results.  
These studies did not control for developmental factors which might have increased 
both the risk of unemployment and the risk of involvement in crime.  Studies which 
have attempted to control for pre-existing differences in propensity to offend, 
however, also find evidence of a relationship between unemployment duration and 
crime.  
  4 
 
In a study of 168 individuals who left school without completing grade 12, Hartnagel 
and Krahn (1989) found a significant bi-variate correlation between the number of 
months an individual spent unemployed since leaving school and self-reported 
involvement in property and violent crime and officially recorded crime.  This 
relationship did not survive the introduction of controls for a range of other factors, 
including the number of jobs since leaving school.  But it is worth noting that 
Hartnagel and Krahn found a significant positive correlation between number of jobs 
since leaving school and period spent unemployed.  The former variable may therefore 
have masked the effects of the latter.  It is also worth noting that their multivariate 
analysis of effect of unemployment duration on crime was based on only about 100 
cases.  Its capacity to detect an effect of unemployment duration was therefore fairly 
limited. 
 
In a much larger prospective longitudinal study of 1,265 children born in Christchurch 
New Zealand and followed up to age 18, Ferguson, Lynskey and Horwood (1997) 
found strong evidence of an unemployment duration effect.  They classified their 
sample into those who reported no exposure to unemployment in a two year period, 
those who reported being employed for two months or less, those who reported being 
unemployed for between three and five months and those who reported being 
unemployed for six months or longer.  They found significant and substantial 
differences between each of these groups in the mean level of self-reported property 
and violent offending and in the percentage arrested for and convicted of an offence.  
Importantly, these differences remained significant when controls were introduced for 
factors pre-disposing individuals to involvement in crime.  This suggests that 
unemployment duration was not functioning as a proxy for other antecedents of 
involvement in crime. 
 
The Chamblin and Cochran Study 
 
To date, the only published aggregate-level study of the effect of unemployment 
duration on crime has been that conducted by Chamlin and Cochran (2000).  Drawing 
on rational choice theory, they begin with the assumption that individuals will engage 
in illegal behaviour when the anticipated gains exceed the costs.  They then point out 
that, since it is the expected costs and benefits which shape behaviour, individuals 
who do not expect to remain unemployed for long are much less likely to engage in 
crime than those who expect to remain unemployed for some period of time.  The 
conventional Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measure of unemployment in the 
United States mainly captures those experiencing short-term spells of unemployment.  
Thus Chamlin and Cochran argue that the best way to test for an effect of 
unemployment on crime is to measure unemployment duration.  
 
Their analysis of the effects of unemployment duration on crime strongly supported 
their argument.  Using ARIMA modelling techniques they found no relationship 
between the conventional BLS measure of unemployment and monthly trends in 
property crime in the United States between 1982 and 1996.  They found a strong 
positive relationship, however, between monthly numbers of property crimes reported 
to police and the number unemployed for 15 weeks or more.  They also found a strong 
negative relationship between the demand for labour and trends in property crime.   
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This is significant because one might expect a downturn in the demand for labour to 
signal increases in unemployment duration.  While they make no claim to have 
‘solved’ the unemployment-crime problem, Chamlin and Cochran’s study provides 
further evidence that past studies of unemployment and crime may have used a flawed 
measure of unemployment.  
 
This said, there are still some limitations in Chamblin and Cochran’s analysis of the 
relationship between unemployment and crime.  They suggest but do not fully explain 
why the net benefits of involvement in crime are likely to be greater for those 
experiencing long-term unemployment than for those experiencing short-term 
unemployment.  They make no attempt to disaggregate unemployment by age or 
gender. Yet, as we have already argued, the opportunity costs of involvement in crime 
are surely different for men and women and for those who are young compared with 
those who are old.  Their alternative measure of labour demand (the capacity 
utilisation rate) is hardly the most direct measure of demand for labour.  Most 
importantly, they pay no regard to education factors, such as school performance and 
achievement, which might be expected to condition a young person’s expectations in 
relation both to employment and future earnings potential.    
 
School participation, school retention and crime 
 
The transition between school and work is a critical one for young people.  For those 
who succeed in school and can look forward with some confidence to a job, it marks 
the point at which at which the pleasures and privileges of adulthood become much 
more fully accessible.  Those who do not do well at school often suffer the frustration 
of being denied this access.  If they drop out of school, or fail to complete it and fail to 
obtain a job, their frustration coincides with a sharp diminution in the level of 
supervision and control characteristic of the school and work environment.  Those 
who leave school around the age of sixteen experience this loss of control at precisely 
the age when they are most prone to involvement in crime.  
 
The possibility that school variables may play an important role in shaping the 
relationship between unemployment and crime has recently been highlighted in 
Australia by Polk and White (1999).  They point out that one of the most notable 
developments in Australia over the last two decades has been the collapse of the full-
time labour market for 16-19 year olds.  Whereas 25 years ago two-thirds of this age 
group were in full-time employment, by the 1990s this figure had fallen to well under 
20 per cent.  In the years between 1983 and 1992 this change was accompanied by an 
increase in school retention rates.  Since 1992, however, school retention rates have 
been in decline.  Those leaving school face now very limited full-time employment 
prospects and must make do with insecure, part-time poorly paid employment.  These 
changes have coincided with a steep increase in several major categories of property 
crime (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001)  
 
Surprisingly, no aggregate-level studies have been reported of the relationship 
between school retention rates and crime.  The only research on this topic has 
focussed on the individual-level effects of poor school performance or ‘dropping out’ 
of high school.  It shows that those who do poorly at school, particularly males, are  
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more likely to offend during their school years (Braithwaite, 1979; Schafer and Polk, 
1967; West, 1984; Baker, 1997).   
 
Elliott and Voss (1974) argued that early school leaving should decrease crime, on the 
grounds that dropping out should reduce school-related frustration and alienation, 
factors they regarded as primary causes of delinquency.  Employing a longitudinal 
design they followed a cohort of students either to high school completion or (if they 
dropped out) up to the point at which they would have graduated, had they remained 
at school.  High school dropouts were found to be more frequently involved in 
delinquency than high school graduates.  However dropouts’ involvement in 
delinquency actually declined after they left school.  This may have been because 
many obtained full-time employment.  Elliott and Voss found that unemployed and 
unmarried dropouts had significantly higher offending rates than unemployed or 
unmarried dropouts. 
 
Farrington et al.(1986) found lower overall rates of offending among youths while 
they were at school than when they were in paid employment.  He argued, however, 
that this effect was probably an artefact of the normal decline in offending rates with 
increasing age.  At age 15 he found no difference between offending rates during 
periods at school and periods in employment.  Unfortunately Farrington et al. did not 
specifically examine the relationship between early school leaving, unemployment 
and crime.  The relevance of his study to our present purposes is also limited by the 
fact that most of the young people in the Cambridge study were living with their 
parents at the time and were not frequently exposed to long periods of unemployment 
(Farrington et al, 1986:352).  
 
Bachman and his colleagues (Bachman et al., 1971, 1978) in their longitudinal study 
found results similar to those of Elliott and Voss.  Generally speaking, those who 
dropped out of school exhibited higher rates of delinquency than those who completed 
school.  However, dropping out of school did not appear to increase a young person’s 
delinquency rate.  As with Elliott and Voss, this last effect may be conditioned by the 
employment experience of those who dropped out of school.  Hartnagel and Krahn 
(1989), for example, found that high school dropouts who were unemployed or 
experienced high levels of job instability were significantly more likely to admit to or 
find themselves convicted of an offence than high school dropouts who succeeded in 
obtaining a full-time job.  
 
It seems likely that the effect of early school leaving depends, at least to some degree, 
upon the state of the labour market.  For the reasons canvassed earlier, other things 
being equal, we would expect lower rates of school retention to produce higher rates 
of offending.  However those dropping out of school early may be far less likely to 
become involved in crime where they either obtain or hold out a reasonable 
expectation of finding satisfactory employment.  If this is true, the effect of lower 
school retention rates on aggregate crime rates will depend upon the ease and speed 
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What now follows explores the relationships between a person’s propensity to 
engage in property crime and factors associated with young people’s labour 
market success, specifically unemployment duration and educational status.  We 
adopt an economic modelling approach. In this context we follow the perspective 
of Becker and others, but this is not to suggest that individuals seek only material 
gain. Where apposite we note the possible relevance of alternative theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
The basis of the model is the assumption that engagement in criminal activity is a 
choice made by individuals in the context of the relative attraction of legitimate 
alternative activities, specifically those associated with job search. A simple way 
to think about this is that in any given short period, unemployed individuals have a 
choice between engaging in job search or committing property crime.  
 
It is assumed that this decision depends on the relative returns to these alternative 
activities, and that these returns are influenced in part by unemployment duration 
and educational experiences. We now explore these roles in detail.  
 
The returns to criminal activity 
 
In our analysis we are concerned principally with property crime, specifically 
activities associated with breaking-in, illegal entry and stealing from domestic 
residencies.  It is assumed that the time period of our analysis is sufficiently short 
so that there are no major changes in technology associated with home security, 
and no significant variations in either the probability of arrest or the penalties 
associated with conviction. 
 
Further, the net returns to criminal activity are assumed to be unrelated to 
unemployment duration. In other words, a person who has been unemployed a 
short time expects to receive the same (material) gains from theft as does a person 
who has been unemployed for a long period of time. 
 
The above simplification is not critical to the empirical analysis, and different 
approaches can be accommodated. For example, there might well be psychic 
returns to crime influenced by unemployment duration. This could be the result of 
sociological factors, such as those experiencing high unemployment duration 
identifying more strongly with groups antagonistic to legal authority; this 
experience would mean that the overall returns to crime would increase with 
unemployment duration.  
 
Our conceptual discussion of the returns to crime with respect to unemployment 
duration is parsimonious. This simplicity has been adopted to highlight what are 
seen to be fundamental relationships concerning the relationship between 
unemployment duration, education and the returns to job search, now explained.  
  8 
The returns to job search activity: the effect of unemployment duration 
 
To motivate our approach, imagine a person with a given stock of human capital 
who enters the labour market at a particular point in time and is initially 
unemployed. As unemployment duration increases there will be consequences 
relevant to labour market opportunities, and thus with respect to the returns to job 
search. These are as follows. 
 
Higher unemployment duration for individuals has several distinct implications.  
The first is associated with skill atrophy, which is unavoidable given the non-use 
of human capital.  Atrophy means that the value of a skill, and thus the return 
from a potential job (wage), falls with unemployment duration. 
 
The second direct consequence of increasing unemployment duration is known as 
state dependence, which can be summarised as follows.  The longer a person has 
experienced continuing unemployment, the lower is the probability of 
subsequently securing a job.  There are two different factors at work (Chapman, 
1993):  
 
(i)  ongoing unsuccessful job search diminishes a person’s enthusiasm for the 
search, partly because the experience engenders a sense of alienation, 
anger and/or despair; and  
 
(ii)  employers are likely to use unemployment duration as a negative signal of 
an applicant’s likely productivity.  After all, employers might reason: “if 
this applicant has been unemployed for a long time it might be because 
she/he is of low productivity”.  And, given skill atrophy, some part of this 
rationalisation for not taking on the long-term unemployed is likely to be 
true. 
 
The bottom line is that, for any given initial stock of an individual’s human 
capital, higher unemployment duration decreases the average value of the stock of 
available jobs, and thus decreases the probability of securing any of the jobs in the 
available set.  Since we assume that the absolute returns to theft are invariant to a 
person’s unemployment duration, it must follow that the relative attractiveness of 
crime increases with unemployment duration. 
 
The returns to job search activity: the role of education 
 
The job search decision will also be influenced by a person’s level of formal 
skills. Specifically, we assume that individuals’ expected rewards from 
employment depend on employers’ perceptions of the value of a person’s human 
capital. Our approach considers two factors of potential relevance to an 
employers’ hiring decision: formal measures of skill, and indicators of motivation 
as reflected in completion of educational experience. 
 
On the first, it is well known fact in Australia and elsewhere that individuals with 
higher levels of completed education earn higher wages (Chapman & Withers, 
2001; Preston, 1998). This could be because education directly affects labour  
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market productivity
1, or could be because individuals completing a course of study 
are seen by employers to be of relatively high “ability” or “motivation”. For our 
analysis this implies that those with relatively high levels of formal schooling 
receive relatively high returns from employment, and thus from successful job 
search. 
 
As with unemployment duration, it is assumed that the rewards from theft do not 
vary with the stock of a person’s human capital, in this case, the level of formal 
education completed.  Thus the role of higher levels of education is to diminish 
the relative attractiveness of criminal activity through their effect on the returns to 
employment. 
 
On the other hand, it might be that employers use the non-completion of formal 
education to indicate relatively poor “ability” or “motivation”.  That is, individuals 
who enrol in the latter years of high school, for example, but do not graduate, 
might diminish their employment prospects, with this then impacting on job 
search activity.  
 
A diagrammatic representation of the above relationships 
 
Diagram 1 is a stylised representation of the above discussion. It illustrates for 
individuals the benefits of engaging in property criminal compared to searching 
for a job, with respect to unemployment duration. In particular, it compares the 
returns to crime (represented by the horizontal line) with returns to job search for 





  (Incomplete Senior High School)
  (Junior High School completion)






  Returns to crime
  Returns to job search 
 
Diagram 1 
Returns to job search and crime for hypothetical individuals. 
 
                                                            
1 Such as through increasing a person’s capacity to learn skills on the job.  
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As discussed above, the returns to crime line is assumed to be invariant to 
unemployment duration. The education lines show the returns to job search 
activity for individuals with three different levels of secondary schooling: senior 
high school graduation; completion of post-compulsory schooling with non-
enrolment in further education (junior high school completion); and being enrolled 
in, but not completing the highest level of secondary schooling (incomplete senior 
high school). 
 
The diagram should be interpreted as follows. Individuals face the choice of 
engaging in the alternative activities of job search or crime, with this decision 
depending on the relative returns. That is, searching for a job will be the preferred 
activity so long as the associated reward exceeds that from criminal activity. Thus 
crime will become preferred at the point of intersection of the education and crime 
lines, since this is when job search becomes the relatively unattractive option. 
 
It is apposite to derive the essential empirical predictions from the diagram and the 
theoretical discussion, which are: 
 
(i)  at any given level of education, criminal activity becomes more attractive 
as unemployment duration increases; 
 
(ii)  at any given level of unemployment duration, individuals with higher 
levels of schooling will be less likely to commit crime; and 
 
(iii)  at any given level of unemployment duration, individuals starting but not 
completing education will be more likely to commit crime. 
 
 




The conceptual framework discussed above provides the basis for our statistical 
analysis and econometric modelling. However, there is an important contextual issue 
concerning the empirical relevance of the theoretical discussion. This is related to the 
nature of the data available to test the essential propositions. 
 
In particular, while the conceptual framework focuses on individual incentives related 
to crime, we are unable to test directly these predictions. This is because the available 
data are not measures of the activities of individuals, and are, instead, time series of 
reported property crime and measures of both labour market and secondary education 
outcomes. Thus our approach implicitly assumes that the broad (non-individual) 
experience reflects accurately an aggregation of the decisions made by individuals. 





  11 
Model specification 
 
The simplest model reflecting our discussion is:  
 
Crime    =  a * (Unemployment duration) +     
   b  *  (High  school  education  success)  +   
      c * (Other labour market measures) +   
   d  *  (Other  economic  controls  )   
 
where a, b, c, and d are parameter vectors. Our theoretical framework predicts that 
a > 0 and b < 0.  The nature and meaning of the variables used to represent the 
above are now described
2. 
 
Data: the dependent variable 
 
Our analysis relates to one type of property crime - breaking, entering and stealing 
(BES) from a dwelling. This is the single largest category of crime recorded by the 
NSW Police Service, with about 80,000 occurrences annually. The data were 
obtained from ‘COPS’, the NSW Police Service database containing information 





Figure 1: Break, enter and steal dwelling (BES) crimes in NSW: number, 












                                                            
2 See also Appendix A for descriptive statistics of all the variables.  
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The total number of crimes reported is unlikely to be an accurate indication of the 
extent of criminal activity, since it takes no account of demographic changes. That 
is, the crime rate per head of population is a more correct measure. This is shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
 









1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Note: The BES measure in this figure has been smoothed with a twelve month moving average.  
The period covered in the graph refers to the transformed series. 
 
 
Independent variables: the duration of unemployment 
 
Everyone in the civilian population aged 15 years and over is employed, 
unemployed, or not in the labour force.  A person is defined as “employed” if 
he/she worked for one hour or more for pay or in a family business in the last 
week of the survey.  To be classified as “unemployed” in the reference period a 
person must be: not employed (according to the previous definition of 
employment); actively looking for work; and, be available for work (see 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Labour Force, Australia, Canberra).  
 
The “duration of unemployment” is also provided by the ABS, and is measured as 
the length of time between the reference period and the date an unemployed 
person first began continuously looking for work. Long-term unemployment 
(LTU) is defined as being unemployed for 12 months or more, and the variable 
used reflects its incidence for young people (aged 15-24 years). That is, LTU is the 
proportion of all young people who have been unemployed for 12 months or more 
rather than just in relation to those who are in the labour force. We use separate 
measures for males and females, and Figure 3 shows the ratio for young males 
(corrected for seasonal influences) to total population of young males.  
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Figure 3: Ratio of NSW young male LTU to young male population: 1989.IV 








1989.4 1990.4 1991.4 1992.4 1993.4 1994.4 1995.4 1996.4 1997.4 1998.4 1999.4
 
 
Independent variables: high school outcomes  
 
We are interested in representing two dimensions of education: the percentage of 
young people graduating from high school; and the proportion of those enrolled in 
post-compulsory schooling who do not graduate. The first is relatively 
straightforward and is known in Australia as the school “retention rate”. The 
retention rate is shown in Figure 4 and is measured as the proportion of high 
school students in a given cohort who graduate, and is thus an indication of the 
success of the education system.  For comparative purposes the Figure also 
includes the BES rate data. 
 
Representing the extent of high school non-completion turned out to be quite a 
challenge for our exercise, because such a variable is not available. However, 
given that the regression analysis uses the retention rate we are able to proxy non-
completion in an indirect way, using the so-called age participation rate. This is 
now explained. 
 
The age participation rate is the number of full-time students of a particular age 
and sex expressed as a proportion of the population of the same age and sex. That 
is, it reflects enrolments. Thus, the combination of retention rate and this variable 
can be interpreted as measuring the proportion of young people who begin, but do 
not complete, high school. Figure 5 contrasts the time profile of the BES rate with 
the school participation rate.  
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Figure 4: The rate of BES (per 1000 adult person, deseasonalized) and the 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































year 12 retention rate (%)
BES per 1000 adult persons
 
Note: BES is measured on the right-hand axis and the retention rate is measured on the left-hand 
axis. 
 
Figure 5: The rate of BES (per 1000 adult person, deseasonalized) and the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































School participation rate (males)
BES per 1000 adult persons
 
Note: BES is measured on the right-hand axis and the participation rate is measured on the left-
hand axis.  
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Other independent variables 
 
In common with other studies investigating the links between crime and 
unemployment, we include a number of measures of the state of the labour 
market. These should be interpreted as measures of both labour supply and labour 
demand, and thus reflect relative job opportunities. They are as follows: 
 
(i)  the labour force participation rate (LFPR): the number employed and 
unemployed as a proportion of the relevant population group (e.g. males 
aged 15-24);  
 
(ii)  the employment-population ratio (EP): the number employed as a 
proportion of the relevant population; and 
 
(iii)  the vacancy rate: the stock of unfilled jobs as a proportion of total 
employment. 
 
Two additional controls included in the estimations represent scale (or 
opportunity) effects: the annual growth rate of NSW gross product per capita and 
per capita retail sales in department stores (in 1990 prices).  Their inclusion in the 
model is designed to capture the effects of economic growth (and hence higher 
incomes) on household spending and thus on the availability of goods which can 
be stolen from dwellings. 
 
Finally, we explored the role of heroin addiction. This is potentially a major issue 
given that a significant proportion of property crime in NSW is committed in 
order to finance the purchase of narcotics. Unfortunately there are no reliable data 
on the number of addicts. However, the NSW Government offers a Methadone 
program, and it is well known that expenditure in this area reflects the number of 
heroin addicts. We can thus proxy the effect of addiction on crime through the use 
of Methadone program user numbers. 
 
 




Before discussing the results of our estimation of models of property crime, it is 
worth pointing out that preliminary testing of stationarity and cointegration 
properties of variables revealed similarity of time-series characteristics of the 
relevant variables and, thus, appropriateness of estimation of classical regression 
models.   
 
Table 1 presents empirical tests of the theoretical model, with several 
specifications being reported. First, we show the results of estimations employing 
the traditional approach used in the crime/unemployment literature. That is, 
property crime activity is modelled to be a function only of the aggregate 
unemployment rate and broad controls; measures of LTU and educational 
outcomes are excluded.  
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Also presented are the results of the model motivated by our theoretical discussion 
(Model A).  Finally, Model B augments this specification with a proxy for drug 
dependence (the ratio of new methadone treatment cases to the population aged 




Table 1: Estimated models of property crime, NSW, 1989.I - 1999.II 
 
Variable  Traditional model    Model A   Model B  
   coefficient  t-ratio     coefficient  t-ratio     coefficient  t-ratio   
LTU/population, males, 15-24           0.217  2.19 **  0.186  2.17 ** 
LTU/population, females, 15-24           -0.065  -0.56    0.039  0.37   
UER: all males  1.630  0.52                     
UER: all females  -3.602  -1.12                     
UER: males, 15-24           -0.138  -0.22    -0.055  -0.10   
UER: females, 15-24           1.013  1.23    1.190  1.67 * 
LFPR: all males  -2.490  -0.64                     
LFPR: all females  6.239  1.10                     
LFPR: males, 15-24           0.133  0.18    0.075  0.12   
LFPR: females, 15-24           -1.274  -1.19    -1.525  -1.66 * 
Emp/population, all males  2.406  0.56                     
Emp/population, all females  -6.794  -1.10                     
Emp/population, males, 15-24           -0.121  -0.14    0.012  0.02   
Emp/population, females, 15-24           1.509  1.23    1.761  1.67 * 
Vacancy rate  -0.694  -1.62    0.354  0.91    -0.302  -0.77   
School participation rate           0.858  4.78 ***  0.706  4.36 *** 
School retention rate to year 12           -0.367  -6.03 ***  -0.320  -5.89 *** 
Gross product, NSW, $'000 p.c.  0.437  1.24    0.220  0.98    0.157  0.81   
Retail sales, dept. stores, $'000 p.c.  6.419  0.49    -20.301  -1.92 *  -4.988  -0.48   
New methadone cases / pop. 15-24                    2.588  3.15 *** 
quarter 1  0.223  0.56    0.324  1.23    0.267  1.18   
quarter 2  -0.274  -0.98    0.385  1.51    0.606  2.63 *** 
quarter 3  0.273  1.08    0.415  1.80 *  0.465  2.34 ** 
Constant  36.267  0.83    -29.429  -2.39 **  -33.604  -3.15 *** 
 
Notes: 
1.  The dependent variable in all models is the break, enter and steal as a rate per 1000 adults. 
2.  The data on net methadone cases is available only untill the second quarter of 1999. 
3.  The asterisks indicate the significance of coefficients: three stars denote significance at 1% 
level, two denote significance at 5% level, one indicates significance at 10% level.   
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Table 2: Summary of diagnostics of the estimated models of property crime 
 
Diagnostic  Traditional model  Model A  Model B 
R-bar square  0.552  0.798  0.851 
Regression F-test  5.21  11.12  14.77 
SEE  0.359  0.241  0.207 
Std.Dev (regressand)  0.537  0.537  0.537 
Jarque-Bera test  0.713  1.658  0.062 
Durbin-Watson  0.941  1.731  1.567 
LM(1)  3.828  0.717  1.389 
ACF: lag 1  3.03  0.52  1.10 
ACF: lag 2  0.97  -1.64  -2.50 
ACF: lag 3  -0.77  -0.84  -1.04 
ACF: lag 4  -0.62  0.88  1.03 
RESET (2)  0.391  0.342  0.070 
 
Notes: 
1.  R-bar square is the adjusted regression coefficient of determination. 
2.  Regression F-test is the test that all coefficients are zero.  The marginal significance value in 
all cases is less than 1%. 
3.  SEE is the standard error of the regression, while Std. Dev (regressand) is the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable.  
4.  Jarque-Bera test is the test for normality of regression residuals.  The critical value is 5.99. 
5.  Durbin-Watson is a test for first-order serial correlation.   
6.  ACF is the residual autocorrelation function.  The entries in the table are the t-ratios of the first 
four coefficients.  The critical value at 1% level is 2.69. 
7.  LM(1) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation of order one.  The critical value at 
1% level is 2.57. 
8.  RESET (2) is a test for regression misspecification.  The critical value at 1% level is 4.46. 
 
 
The important findings are as follows. First, the traditional model performs poorly 
and is not a satisfactory estimation in econometric terms. Specifically, while the 
equation explains more than half of the variation in the dependent variable, the 
explanatory power as indicated by the R-bar square is low for time series.  As the 
same time virtually no regressors are individually significant.  More importantly, 
the regression suffers from a number of econometric problems.  To start with the 
presence of serial correlation (as indicated by low Durbin-Watson statistic and as 
demonstrated by the auto-correlation function (ACF)), indicates that the model is 
not properly specified and is not able to track adequately the behaviour of the 
dependent variable.  Furthermore, the value of the regression standard error 
indicates that the model only marginally improves on the standard deviation of the 
rate of BES (i.e. the model only marginally is able to explain the variations in (or, 
in other words, the behaviour of) the time-series of our dependent variable).  The 
significance of the overall fit of the regression (F-test) in conjunction with the 
insignificance of the individual regressors also suggests that the regression simply 
reflects common trends of the variables (see also the discussion of cointegration 
between the BES variable and the labour market variables in Appendix B). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that this traditionally estimated specification also shows 
no relationship between aggregate unemployment and property crime. It is the type 
of result most often found in the literature and consequently is not a surprise.  
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The other models, A and B, are much more interesting, because the estimations 
are more valid representations of the potential role for property crime of 
unemployment duration and high school completion rates. They differ only in that 
B includes the heroin addiction proxy.  
 
In more detail, both models appear statistically adequate with both regressions 
explaining significant proportion of variation in the BES rate (around 80 per cent 
for Model A and 85 per cent for Model B).  Their standard errors are less than half 
of the standard deviation of the dependent variable and the diagnostic tests 
indicate satisfactory fit without any evidence of model misspecification.   
 
A more detailed look at the estimation results reveals that Model A suggests a 
positive and significant relationship between the level of long-term unemployment 
among young (15-24 years) males and property crime, and a negative and 
significant relationship between crime and the school retention rate variable.  
 
These results are preserved in Model B. Estimation of Model B also indicates that 
a number of control variables, in addition to the unemployment duration and the 
school retention rate variables, are also significant in explaining property crime.  
In particular, our proxy for the extent of heroin addiction appears to confirm the 
anecdotal evidence that a large proportion of property crime is undertaken to 
finance drug purchases by addicts.   
 
In summary, the results from both Models A and B indicate that our theoretical 
specification of the link between crime and both human capital (schooling) and 
employment disadvantage (unemployment duration) is strongly supported. The 




6 Policy  simulations 
 
Since most variables included in our models are entered in the regressions as 
ratios, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward.
3  In 
order to aid the interpretation we now present a number of simulations based on a 
range of targeted labour market programs and education policy scenarios.  Given 
that the emerging message from our modelling is the importance of the interaction 
and interdependence between the states of education, employment and 
unemployment, the scenarios are designed to evaluate the impact on property 
crime of simultaneous  change of both the origin state (that is, LTU) and the 
destination state (education or not in education).   
 
Our starting point of all scenarios is the reduction of the long-term unemployment 
among young males.  This can be achieved either by creating jobs for them, by 
preventing them from becoming unemployed in the first place through continuing 
education, or by sending them to short-term training programs (which, at worst, 
will place them at the conclusion of training back in unemployment but in the 
                                                            
3 Appendix C provides a list of elasticities estimated at the means.  
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short-term category).  We can further distinguish between two types of education-
related programs: those that only care about the beginning of the programs (ie. the 
beginning of the school year) and those that care about the outcome of education 
(i.e. the end of the school year).  Table 3 summarizes the main features of these 
policy scenarios including the final activity outcome for the individuals involved 
(column headed ‘final state’).
4  The last column (headed ‘policy outcome’) simply 
indicates whether the primary objective of the policy is being achieved based on 
the postulated final state of individuals.   
 
To evaluate the impact of these alternative policies we can ask what would be the 
result at a margin, say of a reduction in LTU by 1000 individuals (about 8% of the 
average number of 15-24 years old males in long-term unemployed), and what 
would be the result if all long term unemployment among 15-24 years old males is 
eliminated (which amounts to 7000 individuals at the end of our sample period).  
While we focus in the paper on the latter case, Appendix D includes for 
completeness the simulation outcomes for the first case.  
 
Results and interpretation 
 
The results of our simulations of eliminating LTU among young males are presented in 
Table 4.
5 The tabulations also present the contributions from our three variables of 
interest: the initial effect from the change in the LTU itself, the effect from the change in 
school participation rate and the effect from the change in the school retention rate.  
                                                            
4 While the models presented in Table 1 include a range of labour market variables, our simulations are 
based only on the three key variables: long term unemployment, school participation and school 
retention.  Given that none of the male labour market variables are significant, the extension of 
simulations to incorporate these variables would not have changed either the direction or the relativities 
of impacts of various policies although their numeric values would, of course, be different.  Additional 
calculations which include these variables and also include other scenarios not possible with the three 
variables of interest are available on request from the authors.  These simulations show that the annual 
change in the property crime under the successful education policy (which impacts on labour market 
variables through changes in unemployment rate and labour force participation rate) would amount to 
15.1% (or just under 10,000 cases).  Similarly, differentiation of the outcome in our policy III (which 
results in 7.56% reduction in property crime) between the case when a half ends up in employment as 
opposed to the case when a half ends up in unemployment would generate reductions of property crime 
of 6.0% and 7.6%, respectively.  











Policy type  Description  Initial transition  Further transition  Final state  Policy 
outcome 
I  Targeted labour market 
program (LMP) 
Permanent job creation 
for young people 
LTU to employment  None  Employment  Success 
II Successful  secondary 
education program 
Putting youth through 
complete secondary 
schooling 
LTU to education  None  Education   Success 
III Half-successful 
education program  
Putting youth through 
some schooling but no 
incentives for staying. 
LTU to education  Education to 
employment 
Half in education,  half 







Putting youth through 
none of secondary 
schooling 
LTU to education  Education to short term 
unemployment 
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The results indicate a substantial cost of youth long-term unemployment.  Using 
the preferred Model B results, we can see that a job creation program in NSW 
resulting in placing in employment all long-term unemployed males aged 15-24 
would reduce property crime by close to 7 per cent.  However, if this cohort of 
young people was educated in secondary schools rather than offered the choice of 
dropping out before finishing year 12, the reduction in crime from successful 
education would be twice as large – almost 15 per cent (or around 10,000 less 
cases of break, enter and steal).  These outcomes are also illustrated in Figure 6 
while Figure 7 presents the outcomes as percentages of the actual property crime 
during the last year of the simulation.    
 
Table 4: Simulated effects on property crime (BES) of complete elimination 
of male long-term unemployment amongst males aged 15-24 
 
Policy       Total  effect   
 long-term 
unemployment 
Retention rate  school 
participation 
rate 
Number of BES  % of annual 
BES 
 Model  A 
I -5211  0  0  -5211  7.87 
II -5211  -11248  5314  -11145  16.84 
III -5211  -5624  5314  -5521  8.34 
IV -5211  0  5314  103  -0.16 
 Model  B 
I -4470  0  0  -4470  6.75 
II -4470  -9813  4370  -9913  14.98 
III -4470  -4907  4370  -5006  7.56 
IV -4470  0  4370  -100  0.15 
 
 
Figure 6: The percentage reduction in property crime in NSW due to 
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Figure 7: Property crime in NSW: alternative policy scenario outcomes as 

























To put these percentages in perspective we have translated them into the numbers 
of break, enter and steal. These numbers are given under the heading ‘number of 
BES’ in the tabulations and we have also plotted these outcomes alongside the 
actual number of property crimes during the last year of our simulations (see 
Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8: Property crime in NSW: actual number and simulated numbers 
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Our calculations also indicate that even some education is better than no 
education.  In particular, if long-term unemployed males aged 15-24 are 
encouraged to continue with schooling but half of them drop out before finishing 
year 12, the gain in terms of lower crime is still larger than in the job generation 
case (around 0.8 percentage point on an annual basis or some 500 cases of 
property crime – see also Figure 9).   
 
 
Figure 9: The numerical reduction in property crime in NSW under   

















































This paper has proposed a new theoretical argument behind the link between 
unemployment and crime.  Our modelling is based on the consequences for an 
individual of continuing unemployment duration and the relative returns to 
property crime conditional on one’s education.  In particular, we argue that the 
longer the person is unemployed the higher the relative attractiveness of crime. 
Further, we suggest that higher levels of education diminish the relative 
attractiveness of criminal activity through their effect on the returns to 
employment.  
 
That is, in conceptual terms we offer three significant contributions to the 
literature on the determinants of crime.  First, we treat the unemployed as a 
complex, heterogeneous group, specifically with respect to the duration of 
joblessness.  Second, we explore the role of formal education.  Third, we analyse 
the impact on the decision to commit a property crime with respect to the non-
completion of high school education.   
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Our results support those of Chamblin and Cochran (2000) in suggesting that 
much of the inconsistency in studies of unemployment and crime seems to stem 
from poor conceptualisation of the way in which unemployment influences crime.  
On the other hand, our models which incorporate the sex and age specific 
unemployment duration data results in an adequate empirical specification and 
supports the theoretical expectations.  
 
This does not mean there is no room for improvement in aggregate-level 
modelling of the unemployment-crime relationship. If unemployment duration 
increases involvement in property crime because of its corrosive effect on an 
individual’s expectations of future employment, we would expect other variables 
having similarly corrosive effects (e.g. drug dependence, criminal conviction, 
racial discrimination, broken family backgound) to increase involvement in crime. 
The individual-level effect of these variables is, of course, much easier to measure 
than their aggregate-level effect. The fundamental challenge in developing an 
adequate theoretical account of the aggregate-level relationship between 
unemployment and property crime lies in identifying and measuring key 
determinants of the balance between the expected returns from legitimate activity 
and the expected returns from crime.   
 
Finally, while there may be many theoretical and empirical issues left to resolve in 
relation to unemployment and crime, it is important not to lose sight of the policy 
implications of our findings. Simulations based on our models indicate that long 
term unemployment amongst young males has a substantial effect on property 
crime: elimination of male long term unemployment amongst males aged 15-24 by 
direct job creation would result in close to a 7 per cent reduction in property crime 
in NSW per annum.  Better still, if these individuals continued in formal education 
to the end of year 12 (an extra 7000 individuals) the reduction in break, enter and 
steal over the course of a year would amount to almost 15 per cent. The results 
highlight the potential societal benefits in terms of crime reduction that might 
follow from the institution of policies that are effective in the reduction of long-
term unemployment and promote young people’s educational success.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
 
Variable MEAN  ST.  DEV.  MINIMUM  MAXIMUM 
BES  number  16546  2675.2 13428 22275 
BES  rate  4.27 0.54 3.58 5.40 
UER: all males  8.54  1.89  5.68  12.38 
UER: all females  7.89  1.25  5.88  10.82 
UER: males, 15-24  15.60  3.11  8.16  20.71 
UER: females, 15-24  13.38  2.24  9.23  17.43 
LTU/population:  males,  15-24  2.63 0.90 1.30 4.85 
LTU/population: females, 15-24  1.71  0.62  0.67  3.17 
LFPR:  all  males  73.15  1.13 71.24 75.79 
LFPR:  all  females  51.67  1.17 49.10 53.78 
LFPR: males, 15-24  72.11  2.34  68.32  77.26 
LFPR:  females,  15-24  66.61  2.69 62.02 73.18 
EP: all males  66.91  1.87  63.50  70.99 
EP: all females  47.60  1.32  45.02  49.94 
EP: males, 15-24  60.87  3.14  55.14  67.17 
EP: females, 15-24  57.68  2.56  52.93  63.41 
Gross product, NSW ($'000 p.c.)  9.23  0.64  8.16  10.68 
Retail sales, dept. stores ($'000 p.c.)  0.18  0.01  0.16  0.21 
Vacancy  rate  0.84 0.28 0.30 1.32 
School retention rate to year 12  65.44  5.41  54.40  70.60 
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Appendix B: Analysis of time series behaviour of variables 
 
Recent developments in econometrics have emphasized the role of time series 
properties of variables in correct inferences.  In particular, non-stationarity of 
time-series may invalidate inferences due to the problem of spurious regression 
while different stationarity properties of regressors may indicate a lack of long-
term relationship between variables of interest.  We have subjected variables used 
in our analysis to a test for unit roots (i.e. non-stationarity).  We should note, 
however, that due to the relatively short historical period of time (11 years), these 
results should be treated with caution. 
 
The results, given in Table B1, indicate that the regressand (BES rate) is 
integrated of order one.  For the regressors we can reject the hypothesis of non-
stationarity only for all males unemployment rate, and age-specific female 
unemployment rate.  Given that stationary variables can be used in regressions 
involving non-stationary regressand and regressors, these results suggest that our 
models can include the unemployment rate variable as one of the regressors. 
 
 
Table B1: Tests of unit-root stationarity of variables. 
 
Variable DF  test   
BES rate  -2.45   
UER: all males  -3.42 ** 
UER: all females  -2.81   
UER: males, 15-24  -2.00   
UER: females, 15-24  -3.78 ** 
LTU/population: males, 15-24  -2.14   
LTU/population: females, 15-24  -1.69   
LFPR: all males  -2.24   
LFPR: all females  -2.57   
LFPR: males, 15-24  -2.26   
LFPR: females, 15-24  -2.05   
EP: all males  -3.09   
EP: all females  -1.90   
EP: males, 15-24  -2.15   
EP: females, 15-24  -1.95   
Gross product, NSW ($'000 p.c.)  -1.35   
Retail sales, dept. stores ($'000 p.c.)  -2.70   
Vacancy rate  -2.95   
School retention rate to year 12  -2.59   
New methadone treatment rate  0.92   
 
Notes: 
1)  DF is t-ratio in the Dickey-Fuller test for unit root.  
2)  The critical value at 5% is approximately –3.4, while the critical value at 10% is –3.1. 
 
 
We have also carried out preliminary tests of long-term relationship 
(cointegration) between the BES variable and the unemployment rate variable 
under two conditions.  In the first case, we tested for cointegration between BES 
and only the gender-specific (but not age-specific) unemployment rates.  This 
corresponds to the usual framework of analysis of the link between unemployment  
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and crime.  In the second case we replaced the all-person unemployment rates 
with gender-specific and age-specific equivalents and we also included the 
variables measuring the duration of unemployment and school retention rate.  The 
results indicate that in the first case we can reject the null of cointegration (DF test 
= -7.7 with the critical value of –11.2), while in the second case we cannot reject 
such a hypothesis ((DF test = -14.2 with the critical value of –-11.2).  Such results, 
while only indicative of the long-term links between our variables of interest, do 
provide, however, some empirical support to our theoretical arguments regarding 
the need to include a measure of unemployment duration and education success in 
models linking unemployment and crime. 
  
  30 
Appendix C: Derived elasticities of model variables.  
 
Variable  Traditional model  Model A  Model B 
LTU/population, males, 15-24     0.13  0.11 
LTU/population, females, 15-24     -0.03  0.02 
UER: all males  3.26       
UER: all females  -6.66       
UER: males, 15-24     -0.50  -0.20 
UER: females, 15-24     3.18  3.73 
LFPR: all males  -42.69       
LFPR: all females  75.57       
LFPR: males, 15-24     2.25  1.27 
LFPR: females, 15-24     -19.89  -23.81 
Emp/population, all males  37.73       
Emp/population, all females  -75.79       
Emp/population, males, 15-24     -1.72  0.17 
Emp/population, females, 15-24     20.40  23.81 
School participation rate     9.95  8.18 
School retention rate to year 12    -5.62  -4.91 
Vacancy rate  -0.15  0.07  -0.06 
Gross product, NSW, $'000 p.c.  0.95  0.48  0.34 
Retail sales, dept. stores, $'000 p.c.  0.27  -0.86  -0.21 
New methadone cases / pop. 15-24        0.36 
 
Note: Elasticities are calculated at means. 
  
  31 
Appendix D: Simulated effects on property crime (BES) of a decrease by 
1000 in the number of male long-term unemployed aged 15-24. 
 
Policy       Total effect   
 long-term 
unemployment 





% of annual 
BES 
 Model  A 
I -742  0  0  -742 1.12 
II -742  -1622  759  -1604 2.42 
III -742  -811  759  -794 1.20 
IV -742 0  759  17 -0.03 
 Model  B 
I -637  0  0  -637 0.96 
II -637  -1415  624  -1427 2.16 
III -637  -707  624  -720 1.09 
IV -637 0  624  -12 0.02 
 
Note: Policies are as described in Table 3 in the text. 
 
 
 
 